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EQUITY CROWDFUNDING AND GOVERNANCE: 
TOWARD AN INTEGRATIVE MODEL AND RESEARCH AGENDA 
 
ABSTRACT 
Equity crowdfunding markets have grown exponentially over the last few years. Despite this 
impressive growth, significant informational asymmetry problems may plague these markets, 
making them susceptible to difficulties and even market failure. In this paper, we depart from 
current equity crowdfunding research that focuses almost exclusively on the funding success and 
funding dynamics on platforms to study the effective governance of equity-crowdfunded (ECF) 
firms and how it relates to these firms‘ success. We propose a conceptual model that identifies a 
multitude of governance mechanisms (e.g., internal or external and formal or informal) that 
potentially operate in equity crowdfunding markets to reduce adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems. Further, building on this framework, we offer a roadmap for future research that 
examines how different governance mechanisms may help in the selection and development of 
successful ECF firms. 
 
Keywords: Entrepreneurial finance; equity crowdfunding; corporate governance; information 
asymmetry; adverse selection; moral hazard  
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Attention to corporate governance has intensified over the last three decades, reflecting changes 
in ownership structures, the globalization of financial markets, and the occurrence of the global 
financial crisis (Wright et al., 2013). Some have taken a relatively narrow view of corporate 
governance, defining it as ―the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure 
themselves of getting a return on their investment‖ (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997: 737). Others have 
taken a broader perspective, defining it as ―the determination of the broad uses to which 
organizational resources will be deployed and the resolution of conflicts among the myriad 
participants in organizations‖ (Daily et al., 2003: 371). While much of governance research has 
focused on public firms (Hart, 1995; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), more recently, private firms, 
including family firms and entrepreneurial start-ups have also gained increasing attention 
(Audretsch and Lehmann, 2004; Filatotchev and Wright, 2005; Schulze et al., 2001; Uhlaner et 
al., 2007; Zahra et al., 2009). As a result, governance research has become broader in scope, 
covering a multitude of organizational forms and actors. 
After the 2008-09 global financial crisis, a new ‗hybrid‘ organizational form has 
developed, namely the equity-crowdfunded firm.
1
 Such a firm usually combines characteristics of 
public firms that have a large number of (small) shareholders with those of privately held 
entrepreneurial firms in which ownership and control largely overlap because entrepreneurs 
retain a large share of the equity. This new type of firm developed in post-crisis years as people 
searched for new ways of financing entrepreneurship that have the potential to democratize 
                                                          
1
 Equity crowdfunding is ―a method of financing, whereby an entrepreneur sells a specified amount of equity or 
bond-like shares in a company to a group of (small) investors through an open call for funding on Internet-based 
platforms‖ (Ahlers et al., 2015: 958). In some countries the sale of shares carrying voting rights through 
crowdfunding platforms has not been permitted but profit-participating arrangements are possible. These bond-like 
shares do not carry voting rights (Vismara, 2016). 
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entrepreneurial financing (Mollick and Robb, 2016), by engaging larger segments of the 
investing public and removing financing barriers for entrepreneurs. Nowadays, equity 
crowdfunding plays an important role in entrepreneurial finance. For instance, since 2012, the 
global equity crowdfunding market has roughly doubled in volume each year (Massolution, 
2015) and if this growth continues some have suggested that this market could reach $36 billion 
by 2020, surpassing the size of the venture capital market (Barnett, 2015). In the UK, an 
estimated 20% of all early-stage equity investments already occur through equity crowdfunding 
platforms (Beauhurst, 2015).  
The emergence of equity-crowdfunded (ECF) firms poses challenges to existing theories 
and systems of governance, requiring new thinking about the best approach to structuring the 
relationships among different actors who typically have different incentives and time horizons. In 
agency theory, for instance, the focus is on how external investors should devise governance 
mechanisms to control agency problems but small equity crowdinvestors may have limited 
incentives and power to do so (Ahlers et al., 2015). Moreover, equity crowdfunding involves both 
novel and pronounced governance issues. Governance issues are novel in the sense that small 
entrepreneurial firms typically do not have a large number of investors. As such, there are 
coordination issues and transactions costs that are unique to equity crowdfunding governance. 
Governance issues are more pronounced because small entrepreneurial firms often do not have 
boards, retail investors into crowdfunding are often ‗unsophisticated‘ (as deemed by law in terms 
of wealth and income levels), and investments are very illiquid insofar as the best expectation to 
exit could be many years from the first investment. Thus, there is a need to better understand the 
different governance mechanisms that different actors could use to ensure effective participation 
in equity crowdfunding, while also ensuring ECF firm success.  
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To address these issues, we develop a conceptual model that highlights the multitude of 
governance mechanisms that (potentially) operate in equity crowdfunding markets. Our model 
and related discussion underscore the crucial importance of corporate governance for ECF firms 
and the viability of the equity crowdfunding market. Without such effective governance, this 
market may eventually fail and opportunities for further growth may be missed. Our discussion 
also draws attention to the need for a shift in research on equity crowdfunding from an almost 
exclusive focus on the funding success and funding dynamics on platforms to study the 
governance of ECF firms and how it relates to ECF firm success. Towards this end, we develop a 
research agenda on how corporate governance may help in the selection and development of 
viable ECF firms. 
Even though different forms of crowdfunding exist (e.g., Mollick, 2014), we focus on 
equity crowdfunding for good reasons. First, equity crowdfunding allows for a more direct 
comparison with more traditional external financiers of entrepreneurship that include venture 
capitalists and angel investors. Similar to these financiers, in equity crowdfunding, potential 
monetary returns and the reduction of information asymmetries related to entrepreneurs‘ skills 
and firms‘ prospects are primary concerns (Ahlers et al., 2015; Cholakova and Clarysse, 2015; 
Cumming and Johan, 2013; Vismara, 2018). Second, while other forms of crowdfunding are 
often launched by individuals or represent ‗artistic‘ projects, in equity crowdfunding the 
proponents are by definition firms (Vismara, 2018). Third, unlike the other forms of 
crowdfunding, equity crowdfunding may introduce a large set of new shareholders—with 
divergent secondary interests (besides realizing monetary returns) and time horizons—in firms, 
making corporate governance issues particularly salient (Bruton et al., 2015). 
Our paper contributes to the equity crowdfunding and governance literature in several 
ways. First, current equity crowdfunding research has primarily investigated the factors related to 
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funding success on equity crowdfunding platforms (e.g., Ahlers et al., 2015; Block et al., 2018; 
Guenther et al., 2018; Lukkarinen et al., 2016; Mamonov and Malaga, 2018; Mohammadi and 
Shafi, 2018; Vismara, 2016, 2018; Vulkan et al., 2016) and the funding dynamics on equity 
crowdfunding platforms (e.g., Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2018a; Vismara, 2018; Vulkan et al., 
2016). We provide a more detailed overview of this research in Appendix A. This overview 
highlights the need for a broader investigation, where scholars examine the governance 
mechanisms that may lead to the selection of the most promising firms and benefit the post-
campaign performance of ECF firms. Though it is important for entrepreneurs to raise financing, 
the implications for investors, other stakeholders, and eventually even entrepreneurs themselves, 
may be limited if equity crowdfunding does not allow for the selection of promising firms that 
develop into viable businesses.  
Two recent studies illustrate that a shift in research focus may be necessary and timely. 
Walthoff-Borm et al. (2018a) show that equity crowdinvestors have only access to a relatively 
narrow set of firms that are often highly unprofitable and lack additional debt capacity. This 
observation should not necessarily be a concern because venture capital-backed and angel-backed 
firms often share the same characteristics, and eventually fail. However, we also have many 
examples of such firms that develop into some of the largest ‗celebrity‘ firms in our modern 
economies. However, Signori and Vismara (2018) show that most current exits in equity 
crowdfunding are bankruptcies and there are few successful exits so far. Even though some of the 
surviving ECF firms could eventually develop into the leading firms of the future they could 
equally (and probably more) likely develop into ‗empty shells‘ or ‗zombie firms‘. While 
corporate governance has the potential to stimulate the development of viable ECF firms, we lack 
insights into the governance mechanisms that could operate in equity crowdfunding markets and 
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in particular their effectiveness for creating viable ECF firms that create new jobs and value for 
society at large.  
Second, despite the paucity of empirical evidence, the types and importance of 
governance mechanisms to which ‗traditional‘ public and privately held firms are subject are 
likely to differ from those of ECF firms. For instance, while public firms may have strong track 
records and reputations that could explain why managers often deliver on their promises even 
when they cannot be forced to (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), these mechanisms are generally 
lacking in young ECF firms. Further, public firms are actively monitored, tracked and evaluated 
by information intermediaries, such as stock analysts (Healy and Palepu, 2001) but this is not the 
case for ECF firms and much less in-depth information is available on them. Moreover, in 
contrast to public firms, the shares of ECF firms cannot be sold (easily) given the lack of liquid 
secondary markets (Signori and Vismara, 2018), limiting capital market discipline. There are also 
important differences with privately held firms that raise other sources of external equity finance 
such as venture capital and are subject to due diligence, extensive contracts, and monitoring (e.g., 
Amit et al., 1998; Sapienza et al., 1996). ECF firms, however, raise funding from small and 
oftentimes ‗unsophisticated‘ investors who may lack the knowledge, incentives, and power to 
conduct a due diligence, write extensive contracts and monitor entrepreneurs (Ahlers et al., 
2015). Thus, we cannot simply generalize findings from prior work on public firms with 
dispersed ownership or private firms with concentrated ownership to ECF firms. In other words, 
what works in public firms or in privately held firms might not work in ECF firms and other 
governance mechanisms may be at play that are specific to the equity crowdfunding context.  
Third, we present an integrative model of governance mechanisms that (potentially) 
operate in equity crowdfunding markets. For this purpose, we draw on an information economics 
perspective. The most influential perspective in governance research, namely agency theory, 
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originates from information economics (Eisenhardt, 1989). However, agency theory has focused 
on how ―the principal should seek to avoid or mitigate the agency problem‖ (Arthurs and 
Busenitz, 2003: 148, emphasis added) and portrays entrepreneurs as ―potential thieves or 
deadbeats‖ and investors as ―police officers enforcing the law‖ (Arthurs and Busenitz, 2003: 
156). An information economics perspective argues that there are ‗good‘ and ‗bad‘ entrepreneurs 
and focuses on the role of investors (e.g., the crowd), intermediaries (e.g., crowdfunding 
platforms), country institutions, and even entrepreneurs themselves to minimize informational 
asymmetry problems that are the root cause of many agency issues. These problems include 
‗hidden information‘, which leads to adverse selection problems, and ‗hidden action‘, which 
leads to moral hazard problems (Amit et al., 1998). Thus, we offer an encompassing conceptual 
model of how different actors and environments could minimize informational asymmetry 
problems in equity crowdfunding markets. 
We propose that governance in equity crowdfunding markets will have to involve a broad 
bundle of mechanisms that mitigating costs associated with both adverse selection and moral 
hazard. Adverse selection costs are potentially very pronounced in equity crowdfunding because 
entrepreneurs with higher expected values for their projects have a higher opportunity cost of 
giving up equity, are less likely to want to give up equity, and hence equity crowdfunding is more 
likely to attract ‗lemons‘ (Walthoff-Borm et al., 2018a). Even when the best governance 
mechanisms get established post-investment (if any get established) these cannot turn ‗lemons‘ 
into ‗peaches‘. The governance role played by the platform in screening low-quality projects 
from listing, and from investors to do their due diligence and invest less (or not at all) in low-
quality projects mitigates these adverse selection costs. Governance also reduces moral hazard 
costs associated with entrepreneurs that misuse funds after investment. For example, voting rights 
afforded to investors on the Crowdcube platform in the UK may facilitate better governance 
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(Cumming et al. 2017c). Similarly, legal restrictions on the permissible use of funds can improve 
governance amongst equity crowdfunders (Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2017). 
Having defined the objective and scope of our paper, in the next section, we develop the 
idea why corporate governance is crucial in equity crowdfunding markets and then summarize 
the broad range of mechanisms (e.g., internal and external; formal and informal) that have been 
advanced in extant corporate governance research. We then discuss specific governance 
mechanisms that (potentially) operate in the equity crowdfunding markets, detail how these 
mechanisms can tackle information asymmetry problems, and how future research can contribute 
to answering some key questions that remain unaddressed. In so doing, we hope that our 
discussion helps to offer an agenda for future governance work in the equity crowdfunding 
context and illustrates how this research can also make meaningful theoretical contributions and 
influence policy design. 
INFORMATION ECONOMICS AND THE NEED FOR GOVERNANCE IN EQUITY 
CROWDFUNDING MARKETS 
The information economics literature became particularly prominent after the seminal work of 
Akerlof, Spence, and Stiglitz (e.g., Akerlof, 1970; Spence, 1973; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). It 
focuses on the extent to which imperfect information, which can lead to adverse selection and 
moral hazard, influences decision making in the marketplace (Amit et al., 1998). Imperfect 
information is also a major cause for agency problems because it precludes the writing of 
complete contracts that clarify and stipulate the behavior of entrepreneurs in all eventualities, 
making corporate governance particularly salient (Hart, 1995). 
When investing in young, entrepreneurial firms, external investors are confronted with 
hidden information problems that may lead to adverse selection—the situation where they invest 
in low-quality projects that have been presented to them as high-quality (Amit et al., 1998). This 
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situation is possible because entrepreneurs, who are intimately involved in their firms and their 
internal systems and operations, often have more information on the quality of their firms 
compared to external investors, who can only assess the average quality of firms on the market. 
Entrepreneurs may also have incentives to misrepresent the information they have to their 
advantage when searching for financing. For instance, they may highlight visible signs of 
progress on specific projects while withholding information about other projects or tensions 
within firms that could undermine the viability of firms. Consequently, the information-
disadvantaged investors may only be willing to buy shares at a discount, which reflects their 
information disadvantage. This behavior may lower the average quality of firms that sell shares 
because entrepreneurs of above-average quality firms have no incentive to sell their shares at a 
discount and may thus withdraw from the market, potentially leading to market failure.  
When investing in young, entrepreneurial firms, external investors are also facing hidden 
action problems because they cannot perfectly observe the effort and actions of entrepreneurs 
(e.g., Amit et al., 1998). This situation may lead to moral hazard problems, especially if the goals 
of entrepreneurs and investors are not perfectly aligned. Entrepreneurs, for instance, may shirk 
effort, invest in ‗pet‘ projects (e.g., research projects with limited commercial value) to achieve 
private benefits at the expense of external investors and sometimes even take actions that not only 
harm external investors (and other stakeholders) but also themselves (Schulze et al., 2001). The 
risk of this occurring in entrepreneurial firms is particularly high because of their focus on 
exploration and experimentation, often outside known boundaries. Entrepreneurs also are rule 
breakers, who do not do things in conventional ways, increasing the causal ambiguity 
surrounding their intentions and actions (Harris et al., 2009).  
Traditional external equity financiers have developed a range of mechanisms to reduce 
informational asymmetry problems (Amit et al., 1998). For instance, venture capital and angel 
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investors engage in detailed due diligence pre-investment to reduce adverse selection and active 
monitoring post-investment to reduce moral hazard (Fried and Hisrich, 1994; Sapienza et al., 
1996). They also prefer to invest locally (Cumming and Dai, 2010) and rely on preexisting direct 
and indirect ties between themselves and entrepreneurs to reduce informational asymmetry 
(Shane and Cable, 2002). However, equity crowdinvestors may individually neither have the 
required experience nor the incentives (given their average small investments) to conduct a 
detailed due diligence (Ahlers et al., 2015). Equity crowdinvestors are also investing without 
meeting the entrepreneurial team in person. Moreover, for individual equity crowdinvestors it 
does not make economic sense to bear large monitoring costs. As a result, an information 
economics perspective would suggest that there is a clear danger of adverse selection and moral 
hazard in the equity crowdfunding context, making effective corporate governance crucial.  
 Extant corporate governance research has proposed a range of mechanisms that could 
protect investors and help them create value. These mechanisms can operate within the firm 
(internal mechanisms) or operate outside to the firm (external mechanisms) (Daily et al., 2003). 
The most widely examined corporate governance mechanisms include the board of directors and 
large investors (or ownership concentration), which serve as internal governance mechanisms 
that allow to both control and influence management (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Uhlaner et al., 
2007). Also widely examined are laws that protect investors against expropriation, which serve as 
external governance mechanisms (La Porta et al., 2000; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In their 
survey of the corporate governance literature, Shleifer and Vishny (1997: 769) propose that 
―legal protection of investors and some form of concentrated ownership are essential elements of 
a good corporate governance system‖. While there has been significant attention to the formal 
governance mechanisms described above, there can also be effective informal governance 
mechanisms (Chrisman et al., 2018; Mustakallio et al., 2002). For instance, the external market 
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for corporate control, that is, the threat of a hostile takeover might discipline management. 
Reputations (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) and trusting relationships (Arthurs and Busenitz, 2003) 
may also significantly reduce the probability of entrepreneurs‘ opportunistic behaviors. 
 As highlighted above, much of the existing governance literature examines the 
composition and functioning of boards and the impact of large investors but does not say much 
about information availability. This focus may not be surprising because there is often a great 
amount of information available on established firms. Moreover, large external investors in 
private, entrepreneurial firms (e.g., venture capitalists) have developed a range of mechanisms to 
reduce their informational disadvantage vis-à-vis entrepreneurs. However, informational 
asymmetry issues seem to be an especially important issue for small investors in ECF firms, 
because individual equity crowdinvestors may not have the time, resources and incentives to 
reduce informational asymmetry. Besides leading to wrong decisions to invest, informational 
asymmetries also may lead to the wrong kinds of board and other corporate governance 
mechanisms being established (if any get established) from the start, producing significant 
problems post-investment. Further, equity crowdinvestors may lack the incentives and power 
(related to the dispersion of shares across many small crowdinvestors) to take corrective actions 
post-investment. 
 Ultimately, a combination of governance mechanisms will have to operate in equity 
crowdfunding markets in order to reduce adverse selection and moral hazard problems. These 
mechanisms can operate within and outside ECF firms and can be formal or informal in nature. 
An information economics perspective suggests that without an effective bundle of governance 
mechanisms, the equity crowdfunding market is unlikely to remain a viable alternative in 
entrepreneurial finance. Thus, the role of corporate governance in equity crowdfunding should 
become a central part of the future research agenda. 
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GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS (POTENTIALLY) EMBEDDED IN EQUITY 
CROWDFUNDING MARKETS 
Drawing on the governance as well as the broader management (e.g., Certo, 2003; Filatotchev 
and Wright, 2005), entrepreneurship (e.g., Uhlaner et al., 2007; Wright et al., 2013), and finance 
(e.g., La Porta et al., 2000; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) literature, we propose a conceptual model 
of the multitude of governance mechanisms that may operate in equity crowdfunding markets. 
These mechanisms start with the crowd (investors) but also cover entrepreneurs, crowdfunding 
platforms, and national institutions. As the discussion to follow and related Table 1 make clear, 
these mechanisms vary in terms of their formality (vs. informality) and whether they are internal 
or external. Below, we discuss the effectiveness of these mechanisms in addressing adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems, respectively. We also identify a broad range of issues for 
future research to examine, especially in reference to how these governance mechanisms may 
influence ECF firm success. 
[Include Table 1 about here] 
Crowdinvestors 
In successful equity crowdfunding campaigns, firms typically attract funding from several 
hundreds of small investors (i.e., ‗the crowd‘) (Vismara, 2016). This situation is different from 
the traditional entrepreneurial finance model, where firms generally raise financing from one or a 
few investors. Traditional external equity financiers, such as venture capitalists, rely on formal, 
extensive and costly due diligence processes that occur before making an investment, aiming to 
minimize adverse selection issues (Fried and Hisrich, 1994). As Arthurs and Busenitz (2003: 
150) note, ―the due diligence process is a form of insurance against potential adverse selection‖. 
Through a detailed analysis of investee firms‘ business plans, meetings with entrepreneurs and 
other activities, investors (and their external consultants) aim to separate high-quality firms from 
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low-quality firms. Nevertheless, these due diligence activities entail fixed costs that do not vary 
with the investment size. As a consequence, the cost of these activities for individual equity 
crowdinvestors would be prohibitively expensive relative to their small investments.
2
  
The equity crowdfunding market, however, could rely on another, external and more 
informal governance mechanism aiming to minimize adverse selection risks: the ‗wisdom of the 
crowd‘ (Table 1). The wisdom of the crowd principle (e.g., Surowiecki, 2005) suggests that 
crowds have more diverse sources of information and expertise than any individual (even when 
that individual is an expert), which can be leveraged through group decision making 
(Schwienbacher and Larralde, 2010). Although there is noise in the decision making of each 
individual, this noise is canceled out because of a large number of individuals in the investor 
crowd. Ultimately, this approach is believed to lead to better decision making by the crowd as a 
whole than decision making by the smartest individual from the crowd or an expert (e.g., Mollick 
and Nanda, 2016; Schwienbacher and Larralde, 2010). Thus, the crowd might be more effective 
in minimizing adverse selection issues relative to the traditional financiers of entrepreneurship.  
The wisdom of the crowd mechanism in equity crowdfunding relates to the idea that 
public equity markets are ‗wise‘ or efficient in a semi-strong form. This idea implies that, while 
each individual investor may lack the full set of publicly available information on firms, the stock 
prices reflect all publicly available information and expectations about the future. As Jensen 
                                                          
2
 Isenberg (2012) suggests that venture capital investors ―spent about $50,000 just in legal fees, and sometimes 
hundreds of hours studying the ventures‘ markets, engaging in business model discussions, talking to prospective 
customers, interviewing industry experts, studying the technology and intellectual property, and talking to each 
founder‘s references, sometimes ten or more per founder‖. Such due diligence costs are excessive for individual 
crowdinvestors given that the average investment by an individual investor on Crowdcube—a leading UK-based 
equity crowdfunding platform—for instance, is only about £20,000 ($26,500) (Vismara, 2016). 
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(1978: 96) notes, ―Indeed, the [the Semi-strong Form of the] Efficient Market Hypothesis 
progressed from the state of a curiosity taken seriously by only a few scientists in the economics 
and finance communities, to that of a dominant paradigm in finance‖. One key difference with 
public equity markets, however, is that much less information is publicly available on small and 
young ECF firms.  
Currently, we lack evidence on the potential utility of the wisdom of the crowd in equity 
crowdfunding, relative to the traditional due diligence activities performed by professional 
investors to reduce adverse selection problems.
3
 There may certainly be constraints to the 
wisdom of crowds, leading some critics to highlight the ‗madness of crowds‘. Isenberg (2012), 
for instance, observes that ―crowds bring us tulip crazes, subprime meltdowns, the Kitty 
Genovese scandal, Salem witch trials, and other tragedies‖. Social psychologists and cognitive 
scientists have also pointed out problems with group decision making such as groupthink (Janis, 
1982) and social loafing (Latane et al., 1979). However, we are also much aware of problems that 
occur in venture capital decision-making. Venture capitalists, for instance, may be overconfident, 
which may negatively affect their decision accuracy (Zacharakis and Shepherd, 2001). They may 
also overemphasize an entrepreneurial team‘s human capital when making investment decisions 
(Baum and Silverman, 2004). Thus, both the decision-making of crowds and experts may be 
                                                          
3
 There is some evidence on the wisdom of crowds in reward-based crowdfunding and lending-based crowdfunding 
(e.g., Cumming et al., 2017a; Iyer et al., 2015; Mollick and Nanda, 2016). Nevertheless, while predicting the 
likelihood that firms will provide specific rewards that fulfill a funder‘s expectations or repay their debts is also 
difficult, informational asymmetry is especially high in the equity crowdfunding context (Ahlers et al., 2015). Thus, 
the ability to select high-quality entrepreneurial firms with no (or a limited) track record may be particularly 
challenging (Isenberg, 2012).  
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imperfect. Scholars need to investigate the conditions under which either one of them (or 
potentially a combination of both) will work better to minimize adverse selection. 
One possible way to reduce information asymmetry in equity crowdfunding is to allow for 
‗testing the waters‘.4 This means that entrepreneurs can gauge investor interest through asking for 
non-binding investment commitments from investors prior to obtaining regulatory approval and 
making expenditures on full disclosure. This process helps to provide information to prospective 
crowdinvestors (e.g., by showing investor interest and by allowing them to provide feedback and 
ratings on the proposed project), potentially reducing adverse selection. This type of hypothetical 
investment—before an actual equity crowdfunding campaign—has been met with much 
regulatory debate in the U.S.
5
 But there is a history of such a policy, for instance, on the WiSEED 
equity crowdfunding platform in France (Cumming et al., 2017b). 
Besides addressing adverse selection problems, the crowd may also play a role in 
addressing moral hazard issues (Table 1). However, contrary to external equity financiers who 
write detailed contracts and are involved in post-investment monitoring activities (by taking seats 
in the board of directors, holding frequent meetings with management and similar approaches) to 
reduce moral hazard problems (e.g., Sapienza et al., 1996), it might be economically infeasible 
for individual equity crowdinvestors to bear such contracting and monitoring costs. Also, free 
rider problems are especially acute because if one equity crowdinvestor actively monitors (and 
bears the full cost), this investor must share the benefits with others who do not bear a cost. 
Finally, the crowd usually consists of a diverse group of investors with distinct backgrounds, who 
may have different secondary motives besides realizing financial gains, such as investing for fun 
                                                          
4
 https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2016/06/86824-testing-the-waters-is-all-about-transparency/  
5
 See https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/4855/text  
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or social purposes. As a result, they may also have fundamentally different time horizons. These 
differences make coordination difficult as crowdinvestors may disagree among themselves on 
how the firm should evolve. These differences may also hamper the effectiveness of crowd 
representation on the board, if present.  
The above problems experienced by crowdinvestors are similar to what dispersed 
shareholders in public firms often experience (e.g., Hart, 1995). However, while there are several 
mechanisms that protect dispersed shareholders against moral hazard issues in public firms, the 
wisdom of the crowd mechanism by itself may not be sufficiently effective in reducing moral 
hazard problems after the investment in ECF firms. One reason is that in public firms, 
information intermediaries, such as stock analysts and specialized media, often actively track the 
behavior and performance of listed firms and their management teams (Healy and Palepu, 2001; 
Pollock and Rindova, 2003; Pollock et al., 2008). These intermediaries bring information to 
dispersed public shareholders in a more efficient way than when each shareholder would monitor 
individually. However, these intermediaries typically do not focus on ECF firms which often 
remain ‗under the radar‘. Another reason is that even when equity crowdinvestors observe 
specific moral hazard issues in ECF firms, they might lack the power to influence entrepreneurs‘ 
(or managers‘) behaviors. Indeed, contrary to investors in public firms who can sell their shares 
on public capital markets and thus enforce market discipline, equity crowdinvestors invest in 
illiquid shares that are very difficult, if not impossible to sell (Signori and Vismara, 2018). A 
final reason is that while there is always the possibility of a (hostile) takeover risk for public 
firms with dispersed ownership, so that management can be replaced (Schneper and Guillén, 
2004), entrepreneurs in ECF firms generally retain a significant ownership percentage, which 
makes such actions infeasible.  
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Overall, if crowds are wise, the wisdom of the crowd could be a very effective external 
and more informal governance mechanism that curbs adverse selection. Unfortunately, to date, 
we lack evidence on the effectiveness of the wisdom of the crowd in the equity crowdfunding 
context. Moreover, the crowd might be wise in that it identifies moral hazard problems. Still, 
there are several reasons why without other governance mechanisms the crowd is expected to be 
constrained in addressing moral hazard problems.  
Entrepreneurs 
In agency theory, informational asymmetry allows entrepreneurs to engage in opportunistic 
behaviors. As a result, an important task of the principal (shareholders) is to device governance 
mechanisms that minimize adverse selection and moral hazard (Arthurs and Busenitz, 2003). 
However, in an information economics perspective, particularly high-quality entrepreneurs can 
(and do) also take actions (i.e., self-governance) that reduce information asymmetry problems 
related to their own abilities, the quality of their projects and the prospects of their firms.  
One important way entrepreneurs can reduce potential adverse selection issues, for 
example, is through signaling—where entrepreneurs provide credible pieces of information on 
firms‘ unobservable quality and intentions including strategic moves (e.g., Connelly et al., 2011). 
Because entrepreneurs may have incentives to positively bias information or withhold negative 
information when they search for external financial resources, simply stating that they are ‗good‘ 
or of high-quality will not be effective (Amit et al., 1998). In signaling theory (Spence, 1973), 
which has its roots in information economics as well, observable attributes function as a credible 
signal of unobservable quality, when these attributes are correlated with unobservable quality and 
are costly or difficult to obtain for low-quality firms relative to high-quality firms. Thus, by 
signaling, high-quality entrepreneurs can potentially differentiate their firms from low-quality 
entrepreneurs, potentially reducing adverse selection issues.  
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Past research has shown how entrepreneurs and managers engage in signaling 
unobservable firm quality to facilitate resource acquisition; for example, by making decisions 
about their boards‘ structures and adding prominent board members (e.g., Certo et al., 2001; 
Certo, 2003) and with endorsement relationships, including prominent VC investors and alliance 
partners (e.g., Colombo et al., 2019; Stuart et al., 1999), among others. Consistent with these 
findings, equity crowdfunding research also suggests that entrepreneurs signal unobservable firm 
quality to equity crowdinvestors, aiming to increase their fundraising success (e.g., Ahlers et al., 
2005; Vismara, 2016; Vulkan et al., 2016). One consistent finding, for instance, is that when 
entrepreneurs retain more equity this serves as an important signal that positively impacts the 
probability of funding success (Ahlers et al., 2005; Vismara, 2016). Moreover, Ahlers et al. 
(2015) show that when entrepreneurs provide more detailed information about risks, they 
increase the probability of funding success. Vismara (2016) also shows that social capital 
influences the probability of funding success.  
 As indicated in Table 1, signaling by entrepreneurs may serve as an internal, informal 
(self) governance mechanism that is activated as entrepreneurs engage in the acquisition of equity 
crowdfunding. Nevertheless, existing studies on equity crowdfunding—just like signaling studies 
in the management literature more broadly—examine how signals influence resource attraction 
but this does not provide direct evidence that these signals are effective mechanisms in reducing 
adverse selection issues. Thus, existing research has not fully leveraged insights from signaling 
theory in information economics. More specifically, for signals to separate high-quality from 
low-quality entrepreneurs and their firms, the signal‘s expectations (i.e., the correlation between 
the observable characteristic and unobservable quality) should eventually get confirmed (Bergh et 
al., 2014). However, we lack evidence on whether specific signals are eventually correlated with 
firm success and might be an effective governance tool for entrepreneurs to reduce adverse 
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selection concerns of crowdinvestors. The growing availability of data in the crowdfunding 
context should allow scholars to address these important issues in future studies—and provide the 
potential to make important contributions to signaling theory as well.  
 Moreover, as detailed before, existing studies have shown how entrepreneurs can signal 
unobservable firm quality with prominent broad members, or prominent exchange partners to 
facilitate resource attraction (Certo, 2003; Stuart et al., 1999). An important question that 
remains, however, is how entrepreneurs of very early-stage firms can assemble the resources 
needed to attract managerial talent, affiliate with prominent others or stack their boards with 
industry leaders in the first place (e.g., Shane, 2003) to then signal their unobservable quality. 
Moreover, many early-stage firms do not have formal boards (Uhlaner et al., 2007). Given these 
factors, the equity crowdfunding context provides an ideal setting in which to examine these 
important issues.  
There is some evidence that equity crowdinvestors also rely on ‗cheap talk‘ or non-
binding, non-verifiable and costless claims made by entrepreneurs (Farrell and Rabin, 1996). 
Specifically, Ahlers et al. (2015) show that claims by entrepreneurs that they envisage an IPO 
exit (48% of entrepreneurs in their sample do) increase the odds of a successful equity 
crowdfunding campaign. This finding suggests that equity crowdinvestors rely not only on 
credible signals but also on other types of communication. Thus, there is a possibility that equity 
crowdinvestors react to communications that do not represent the facts, which may foster adverse 
selection problems. This evidence provides opportunities for further research that examines how 
entrepreneurs combine costly signaling and other forms of communication, why the investors 
would rely on cheap talk, and when different types of credible signals or other types of 
communications become more impactful for subsequent resource attraction and firm success.  
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 Finally, just like equity crowdfunding studies have focused on possible signaling by 
entrepreneurs around the time of the equity crowdfunding campaign (e.g., Ahlers et al., 2015), 
entrepreneurial finance scholars have generally investigated signaling around specific events, 
including VC fundraising or an IPO (e.g., Certo, 2003; Colombo et al., 2019; Ko and McKelvie, 
2018). However, more substantive actions that relate to firm professionalization with which 
entrepreneurs signaled to raise early funds, such as setting up a formal board of directors, may 
have a more long-standing impact on firm behavior and success. Moreover, high-quality 
entrepreneurs may have incentives to engage in signaling across time in order to reduce 
crowdinvestors‘ moral hazard concerns (Table 1) and low-quality entrepreneurs can also 
(deliberately or not) provide signals that reveal their true nature (Arthurs and Busenitz, 2003). 
For instance, by providing timely and accurate information, high-quality entrepreneurs can signal 
their trustworthiness. By doing so, entrepreneurs can also reduce the need for formal governance 
mechanisms. However, the question remains how equity crowdinvestors can take corrective 
actions and reduce moral hazard when they receive signals of low-quality or inappropriate 
entrepreneurial behavior after the investment has taken place, given that crowdinvestors obtain 
shares that are illiquid and cannot be easily traded.  
Overall, our preceding discussion suggests that when crowds are wise, entrepreneurial 
signaling could be an effective internal and informal governance mechanism that could limit 
adverse selection, although empirical evidence is lacking. We also highlight that signaling and 
related substantive entrepreneurial actions could reduce moral hazard issues but may also be 
insufficient by themselves (and will need to be combined with other governance mechanisms) to 
completely remove these issues in equity crowdfunding markets. 
Crowdfunding Platforms 
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When entrepreneurs decide they want to raise funding through a specific equity crowdfunding 
platform, their firms will not automatically list on these platforms. Rather, these platforms play 
an increasingly important role in filtering firms for their audiences (Younkin and Kashkooli, 
2016). They also play a key role in determining the way in which the relationship between firms 
and equity crowdinvestors will be structured. In some cases, for example, crowdinvestors become 
direct shareholders in the firms they wish to fund but other platforms have used alternative 
structures. Despite heterogeneity between equity crowdfunding platforms, most evidence so far 
relates to one or a few platforms (e.g., Dushnitsky and Zunino, 2018). 
There are many equity crowdfunding platforms active across the globe and even within 
single countries (Dushnitsky et al., 2016). For instance, in Italy, there are tens of active equity 
crowdfunding platforms and some of them come from abroad. Consequently, there will be a 
strong pressure for reputation building (e.g., Petkova, 2012) and professionalization by 
crowdfunding platforms to attract the best projects, retain a large base of equity crowdinvestors, 
and withstand competition from peers (Fleming and Sorenson, 2016). If people observe many 
outright fraud cases or failures on specific platforms, these platforms may experience a 
significant drop in the number of entrepreneurs who want to list their firms and a similar 
significant drop in crowdinvestors who want to contribute funds. This may threaten the very 
survival of these platforms. Moreover, competition from traditional entrepreneurial finance 
markets, including venture capital and angel markets, may further push the equity crowdfunding 
market and individual platforms to professionalize and consolidate. 
Such reputational concerns by equity crowdfunding platforms and competition from 
alternative forms of financing may give equity crowdfunding platforms strong incentives to 
preselect the highest quality firms. To mitigate adverse selection problems, different 
crowdfunding platforms undertake due diligence (Table 1), which may serve as an external and 
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more formal governance mechanism. However, there is great variance in the extent of such due 
diligence across platforms. Crowdfunding platform due diligence could comprise background 
checks, site visits, credit checks, cross-checks, account monitoring, and third-party proof on 
funding projects. Cumming and Zhang (2018) find evidence of more due diligence performed by 
Canadian platforms that have fewer projects per employee (the busyness of platform employees 
constrains the ability to carry out due diligence) and incentive fee structures (platforms with fixed 
fees regardless of campaign outcomes carry out less due diligence). Because due diligence 
screens lower quality projects, Cumming and Zhang (2018) also find that more extensive due 
diligence by platforms is associated with a higher percentage of successful campaigns and larger 
capital raises on these platforms. Subsequent research (Rossi and Vismara, 2018) from 
investment-based platforms in France, Italy, Germany, and the UK is supportive of these 
findings. 
 While some equity crowdfunding platforms engage in more detailed due diligence to 
reduce adverse selection issues, we currently lack compelling evidence if this due diligence is 
effective and ultimately leads to more successful firms being funded (and not just firms that raise 
more financing on these platforms). These questions are important because more detailed due 
diligence by crowdfunding platforms may be at odds with the wisdom of the crowd mechanism, 
as discussed earlier, presenting an important anomaly. Specifically, if crowds are wise, the 
primary role of equity crowdfunding platforms would be to avoid outright fraud cases getting on 
the platforms and assure that the information provided in the crowdfunding campaign represents 
the facts. However, if equity crowdfunding platforms increasingly mirror the selection criteria 
typically used by traditional investors in entrepreneurial firms, this may limit the possibility of 
equity crowdfunding to democratize entrepreneurial finance. 
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Equity crowdfunding platforms differ in their selection activities as well as other 
dimensions. For example, platforms often employ different shareholder structures—i.e., how they 
structure the relationship between equity crowdinvestors and firms. To date, the longer-term 
implications of these different structures for ECF firm actions and success remain largely 
unexplored (Cumming and Wright, 2017), although there may be significant variability in their 
effectiveness in addressing moral hazard and adverse selection problems (Table 1). 
Some platforms use a direct shareholder model where each equity crowdinvestor 
individually becomes a direct shareholder in a firm. In the case of Crowdcube, a leading UK-
based equity crowdfunding platform, for example, crowdinvestors may receive A-shares with 
voting and preemptive rights when they invest at or above a (possible) investment threshold or 
receive B-shares without voting and preemptive rights when they invest below the threshold 
(Cumming et al., 2017c). Crowdcube does not recommend any shareholders‘ agreement for the 
crowd (Walthoff-Borm et al., 2018b). The direct shareholder model most closely resembles the 
private firm with dispersed ownership, where an informational economics perspective suggests 
that shareholders may have little incentive and power to monitor (Hart, 1995) given their small 
investment. While this shareholder structure might be less effective in reducing moral hazard 
problems, it also has advantages. For instance, it might foster ―the feeling of belonging‖ 
(Belleflamme et al., 2014: 589) by allowing crowdinvestors to be more directly connected to the 
ECF firm. 
Other platforms use a nominee structure. In this case, equity crowdinvestors do not 
become direct shareholders in firms but they invest in ‗special purpose vehicles‘ that combine all 
equity crowdinvestors and are managed by nominees (i.e., the platform itself or an external 
individual). For instance, in the case of Seedrs—another prominent UK-based equity 
crowdfunding platform—the management board of Seedrs Limited acts as a nominee. Seedrs 
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develops subscription agreements with ECF firms that generally include consent rights that cover 
issues such as the winding-up of ECF firm, issuing preference shares, transferring assets out of 
the ECF firm, making certain loans or increasing director salaries beyond an agreed level 
(Walthoff-Borm et al., 2018b). The management board of Seedrs Limited is authorized to take 
votes and issue consents on behalf of each individual investor that provided funds through 
Seedrs. However, Seedrs Limited does not take a seat on the board of their portfolio companies. 
Because nominees generally share in the value created at an exit, they have incentives to monitor, 
Thus, free rider problems among individual crowdinvestors are avoided. The nominee structure 
further reduces shareholder dispersion and decreases coordination costs, giving the nominee the 
power to influence entrepreneurs‘ behaviors. Hence, a nominee structure might be more effective 
to reduce possible moral hazard issues. A potential disadvantage of this structure is that it 
decreases crowdinvestors‘ feeling of belonging by creating a wedge between the crowd and the 
ECF firm.  
Other platforms (e.g., SyndicateRoom) require firms to also obtain co-funding from 
venture capitalists or angel investors. In this case, the equity crowdinvestors may benefit from the 
detailed due diligence (that could limit adverse selection) and monitoring (that could limit moral 
hazard) by the professional (lead) investor (Agrawal et al., 2016). This structure resembles 
syndication in venture capital investments, with the difference that all syndicate members 
generally conduct their own detailed due diligence and monitor the portfolio companies as well 
(Baeyens et al., 2006). While this structure may seem to combine the best of two worlds (detailed 
due diligence and monitoring by a professional investor and the wisdom of crowds) it also raises 
new concerns. The need for co-investment with traditional financiers may limit the 
democratization of entrepreneurial finance. Moreover, harmful co-investments and principal-
principal problems could occur (e.g., Morck and Yeung, 2003). For example, there is the risk that 
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more powerful venture capital investors expropriate wealth from less powerful crowdinvestors. 
Still, venture capital investors often care about their reputations, which are crucial in their 
industry, and as such, they might refrain from taking actions that harm other minority 
shareholders in ECF firms. 
Another recent development is that some equity crowdfunding platforms have started to 
experiment with the creation of secondary markets to increase liquidity (Table 1). Currently, the 
shares of ECF firms are illiquid and difficult to trade (Signori and Vismara, 2018). Some 
crowdfunding platforms, for example, enable investors to trade shares at ‗fair value‘ to the 
current investors in a given firm (e.g., Seedrs). Others have organized an on-platform secondary 
share trade (e.g., Crowdcube). More liquid secondary markets may increase the information 
available through the share price. When minority shareholders are unhappy with firms‘ plans or 
actions, they can sell their shares. When entrepreneurs cannot convince other prospective 
investors of the value of their plans or actions, entrepreneurs will see the value of their shares 
decreasing. Such market discipline might influence entrepreneurial behavior and minimize moral 
hazard issues.  
Overall, as our preceding observations indicate, there is significant heterogeneity among 
equity crowdfunding platforms but current research has largely ignored this heterogeneity and 
how it relates to ECF firm success. Our discussion also highlights how platform heterogeneity 
and related differences in external governance mechanisms induced by these platforms (e.g., 
platform due diligence, shareholder structures, the provision of shares with or without voting 
rights, and secondary markets) may affect the potential for adverse selection and moral hazard 
issues to occur and thereby significantly impact ECF firm success.  
Country Institutions 
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It is well-established that countries‘ formal (i.e., the codified rules and standards) and informal 
institutions (i.e., the collective meanings, values and understandings shared by its inhabitants) 
define or enforce socially acceptable behavior and thereby influence firm performance (Holmes 
et al., 2013, 2016; North, 1991; Scott, 1995). Some of these institutions may limit the adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems and serve as external governance mechanisms (Chrisman et 
al., 2018). For instance, stronger investor protection enshrined in a country‘s legal codes and 
regulatory frameworks may limit managers‘ ability to engage in self-dealing, including executive 
perquisites, excessive compensation, or even outright theft of corporate assets (Djankov et al., 
2008; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). There are also important differences between national cultures 
and dominant values. For instance, higher country-level trust might reduce opportunistic behavior 
by individuals (La Porta et al., 1997a). Such informal institutions also support and reinforce 
formal institutions; together, they can significantly reduce informational problems, fostering the 
performance of firms and the growth of entire financial markets. 
Scholars have examined how formal and informal institutions influence the behavior of 
venture capital investors and the development of venture capital markets as a whole. For instance, 
research shows that cross-country differences in legality have a significant impact on the 
governance structure of investments in the venture capital industry: better laws facilitate faster 
deal screening and deal origination, lower the probability of potentially harmful co-investment, 
and facilitate investor board representation (Cumming et al., 2010). Cultural distance between 
venture capital investors and entrepreneurs may hamper deal screening, contracting and post-
investment involvement and monitoring (Li et al. 2014). Ultimately, formal institutions and 
informal national cultural constraints can even influence the development of venture capital 
markets as a whole (Li and Zahra, 2012). 
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Scholars have also started to provide a descriptive picture of the formal legal institutions 
related to equity crowdfunding markets, especially the laws that regulate access to equity 
crowdfunding for firms and crowdinvestors (e.g., Vismara, 2016; Horváthová, 2018). Legal 
restrictions on public offerings of shares to the general public have constrained the development 
of equity crowdfunding markets in many countries (Bruton et al., 2015). For instance, equity 
crowdfunding has played a trivial role in the US, probably because SEC regulations required 
entrepreneurial firms that solicit equity investments from non-accredited investors to register for 
a disproportionately costly public offering. With the SEC approval of Title III of the JOBS act, 
non-accredited, amateur investors will now be able to invest in such entrepreneurial firms. Yet, 
regulations do not always positively influence the size of crowdfunding markets. For example, in 
the Canadian case, despite introducing equity crowdfunding rules in 2016, no entrepreneur to 
date has used the Canadian crowdfunding securities exemption. Informal institutions have also 
been correlated to various crowdfunding metrics; but because informal institutions show little 
variation over time, the cross-country nature of the evidence does not directly allow causal 
inference (Cumming et al., 2017d). 
Horváthová (2018, Table 28.1) summarizes equity crowdfunding regulations in 42 
countries around the world. Countries with specific crowdfunding regulations as of 2017 include 
Austria (2015), Canada (2015), China (2015), Finland (2016), France (2014), Germany (2015), 
Israel (2017), Italy (2012), Japan (2014), Lithuania (2016), the Netherlands (2016), New Zealand 
(2014), Portugal (2015), Spain (2015), the U.K. (2000), and the U.S. (2012, 2015). Countries 
without specific crowdfunding regulations normally have securities regulations that are pertinent 
to crowdfunding activities. Such countries include Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, 
Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, and Switzerland. Further, some countries 
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have crowdfunding legislation proposed but not yet signed into law. Examples are Australia, 
Israel, Latvia, and Luxembourg. And other countries such as Russia have recently put together 
working groups to develop crowdfunding rule proposals. 
Still, existing crowdfunding research has only skimmed the surface of how country 
institutions may limit adverse selection and moral hazard issues in equity crowdfunding markets 
and thus influence firm success. One may ask why there is such limited research, given the 
widespread interest in institutions in the management literature, the fact that cross-border 
crowdfunding is commonplace and the potential role of crowdfunding in entrepreneurial 
internationalization (Cumming and Johan, 2016). We believe this lack of evidence relates to the 
current focus in equity crowdfunding research on funding success on platforms. Thus, as 
highlighted before, while some studies have begun to study how institutions influence the size of 
equity crowdfunding markets as a whole, we lack empirical evidence on how (bundles of) 
country-level institutions might influence the selection and development of viable ECF firms in 
different countries (Table 1). Clearly, future research needs to address several complex issues.  
One common issue is that the heterogeneity in the scope and goals of laws often remains 
underappreciated. Specifically, some laws regulate the amounts of money that firms can raise or 
the maximum amount of money investors can invest in equity crowdfunding campaigns. For 
instance, in the UK, there is an aggregate investment limit of 10% of net investable financial 
assets that can be allocated to equity crowdfunding by individual investors (Hornuf and 
Schwienbacher, 2017). In essence, these laws might have limited effects on reducing potential 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems but do limit the exposure of investors to the risks 
and uncertainty involved in equity crowdfunding.  
Other laws focus on specifying the types of firms that can raise equity crowdfunding (or 
not) or focus on increasing the flow of information towards equity crowdinvestors. These laws 
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might limit potential adverse selection. Laws that increase information availability also make it 
more likely that equity crowdinvestors detect moral hazard problems in ECF firms. However, 
they might still be hampered in taking corrective actions against moral hazard. Moreover, using a 
theoretical model, Hornuf and Schwienbacher (2017) provide interesting insights into the impact 
of exemptions to prospectus regulations on entrepreneurs‘ fundraising decisions. Specifically, 
they argue that restrictive laws may create a funding gap for small firms.  
Still other laws focus on the rights that shareholders have vis-à-vis the assets of the firm 
and how shareholders can appeal to courts to enforce their rights when entrepreneurs violate the 
terms of the contract (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). These laws do not necessarily increase the 
costs for entrepreneurs that search for equity crowdfunding when they stick to the shareholders‘ 
agreement. While we lack empirical evidence, these laws may be effective in minimizing moral 
hazard problems, thus improving ECF firm performance. Overall, our discussion suggests that we 
need a much finer-grained understanding of how distinct aspects of laws may influence the 
development of viable ECF firms, which can also bring important contributions to the law and 
finance literature.  
 A related issue is that we need to be careful in borrowing and employing legal measures 
that have been developed for specific sets of firms (e.g., public firms with dispersed ownership) 
to other sets of firms because the legal reality can be very different for these other sets of firms 
(e.g., firms with concentrated ownership). As Bebchuk and Hamdani (2009: 1263-1264) argue: 
―The impact of many key governance arrangements depends considerably on companies‘ 
ownership structure: measures that protect outside investors in a company without a 
controlling shareholder are often irrelevant or even harmful when it comes to investor 
protection in companies with a controlling shareholder, and vice versa. Consequently, 
governance metrics that purport to apply to companies regardless of ownership structure 
are bound to miss the mark with respect to one or both types of firms.‖ 
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For instance, several elements of the widely-used Anti-Director Rights Index (La Porta et al., 
1997b) are not relevant for firms with a controlling shareholder (and in many ECF firms, 
entrepreneurs remain controlling shareholders). More specifically, elements of the Anti-Director 
Rights Index, such as shareholders‘ ability to vote by mail or to call a special meeting, will be 
ineffective in protecting the rights of minority shareholders (e.g., crowdinvestors) in firms where 
entrepreneurs hold the majority of shares. Indeed, in such a situation, the crowd (or any other 
minority shareholder) will lack the power to fundamentally influence or challenge entrepreneurs, 
as majority shareholders. The Anti-Self-Dealing Index (Djankov et al., 2008), however, does 
focus on elements that protect minority shareholders from possible moral hazard issues. In a 
similar vein, scholars have sometimes paid disproportionate attention to corporate bankruptcy 
laws, while personal bankruptcy laws may be theoretically more impactful in an entrepreneurial 
setting (Armour and Cumming, 2008). 
Our preceding observations suggest that, as we move forward, it will be important to 
examine how (bundles of) formal and informal country institutions, which might serve as 
external governance mechanisms, influence the selection and development of viable ECF firms. 
Scholars need to ensure that they focus on appropriate country institutions. Indeed, the 
institutional indices that have been developed for other types of firms (and have been shown to be 
relevant for these firms) may not be relevant for ECF firms. 
GOVERNANCE AS THE PROTECTION OF VALUE AND THE CREATION OF 
VALUE 
The idea that entrepreneurs have an information advantage with respect to the quality of their 
firms, projects and own abilities, over external stakeholders, including investors, is well-
established in the literature (Amit et al., 1998). Thus, entrepreneurs can use this information 
advantage to the detriment of other stakeholders. Up to this point, our analysis has primarily 
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focused on the role of corporate governance in avoiding adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems (Table 1) or, in other words, the role of governance in protecting shareholders‘ wealth. 
This focus is commonplace in the corporate governance literature (Uhlaner et al., 2007).  
 However, scholars have also highlighted situations in which entrepreneurs lack 
information about their industry, their competitors and the new capabilities that will be required 
as their firms grow (Zahra and Filatotchev, 2004). These ‗blind spots‘ in the information, 
knowledge and experiences of entrepreneurs are one of the main reasons why professional 
external equity investors often spend significant effort and time on their so-called ‗coach‘ 
function (Colombo and Grilli, 2010; Sapienza et al., 1996). There is increasing recognition in the 
governance literature that governance could also serve as a source of wealth creation in firms 
(Filatotchev and Wright, 2005; Zahra et al., 2009). For instance, firms‘ board of directors or 
advisory boards may help entrepreneurs to collect new information about their industry and 
competitors, helping entrepreneurs to make more effective strategic choices (Zahra et al., 2009).  
 Thus, while entrepreneurs may have certain information advantages relative to other 
stakeholders, some stakeholders may also have specific information advantages relative to 
entrepreneurs. Ultimately, the exchange of information among these key actors in the corporate 
governance systems of firms will be crucial for their long-term success (Zahra and Filatotchev, 
2004). Currently, we lack insights on how the governance mechanisms in the equity 
crowdfunding market—and particularly the wisdom of the crowd—may bring new information to 
entrepreneurs, allowing them to make better strategic decisions that benefit firm development 
while addressing the potential downside of these mechanisms. We propose that the equity 
crowdfunding market and equity crowdinvestors may provide both opportunities and threats to 
information exchange and, as a result, value creation in ECF firms. 
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 More specifically, crowdfunding campaigns can play a key role in bringing new 
information and knowledge to entrepreneurs that provide them with important insights into 
opportunities and how to best pursue them (Afuah and Tucci, 2012). This role can be performed 
in multiple ways. First, the equity crowdfunding market may provide a ‗laboratory‘ for 
entrepreneurs and equity crowdinvestors alike. Entrepreneurs can pitch their business ideas to a 
broad set of individuals. Significant investment interest by the crowd indirectly provides 
information to entrepreneurs about the viability of their ideas. For equity crowdinvestors, it 
further allows spreading the risk related to funding early stage, potentially innovative ideas. 
Second, entrepreneurs may also acquire valuable information in a more direct way. Individual 
equity crowdinvestors, for example, not only contribute (small) amounts of money, they are also 
frequently active in providing comments, feedback and more or less innovative ideas to 
entrepreneurs. Such indirect and direct information flows from equity crowdinvestors to 
entrepreneurs might give the latter with more confidence in their business ideas and provide new 
information to better pursue existing opportunities, while pointing toward new opportunities.  
 However, the diversity of equity crowdinvestors—in terms of background, possible 
secondary motives to invest next to financial gains, and time horizons—might also bring 
significant challenges for ECF firms. Effective governance systems require an understanding of 
the motives of its key players (Zahra and Filatotchev, 2004), but the crowd could be so diverse 
that such an understanding is very difficult to obtain for entrepreneurs. The different feedback, 
comments and ideas provided by such a very diverse group of people can also lead to 
‗information congestion‘. It is also likely that when entrepreneurs choose a specific strategic 
action that pleases some equity crowdinvestors, it makes others feel disgruntled. Finally, given 
that the information flows between equity crowdinvestors and entrepreneurs often occur in 
public, such a situation may lead to the release of sensitive information that may ultimately harm 
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the ECF firm. Thus, despite the potential value of the information that is embedded in the crowd 
for ECF firms, the same crowd also raises important challenges.  
 Overall, it is clear that we need more research on how governance mechanisms may limit 
informational asymmetry and related adverse selection and moral hazard issues in equity 
crowdfunding. It is also crucial for future scholarship to improve our theoretical and empirical 
understanding of how equity crowdinvestors may help to create value in ECF firms. From the 
discussion we presented above, it should be clear that equity crowdinvestors can both contribute 
to, but also hamper, effective governance that creates value for ECF firms. Research on these 
potential effects is necessary. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The global equity crowdfunding market presents an important conundrum. On the one hand, this 
market is growing exponentially and has the potential to democratize entrepreneurial finance by 
reducing barriers for both entrepreneurs and small investors. On the other hand, this market is 
replete with informational asymmetry problems, such as adverse selection and moral hazard, 
which may eventually cause its failure. Corporate governance can play a crucial role in 
alleviating such adverse selection and moral hazard problems and thereby sustain the growth of 
the global equity crowdfunding market.  
Existing corporate governance research, however, has primarily focused on large and 
public firms. More recently, this research has also embraced other, more commonplace, 
organizational forms such as small and medium-sized enterprises and entrepreneurial firms. Still, 
our understanding of what works (or does not work) in one type of firm may not generalize to 
other types of firms (Audretsch and Lehmann, 2014), including the ECF firms we have discussed 
throughout this paper. For example, relative to shareholders in public firms, shareholders in ECF 
firms obtain illiquid shares, which should limit capital market-based corporate governance 
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mechanisms. Similarly, relative to professional venture capital investors in entrepreneurial firms, 
the large number of small online crowdinvestors in ECF firms may have limited incentives and 
power to conduct a detailed due diligence and actively monitor their portfolio firms. 
 Our paper calls for a fundamental shift in the focus of equity crowdfunding research, 
which has almost exclusively focused on the factors that drive funding success on equity 
crowdfunding platforms (e.g., Ahlers et al., 2015; Block et al., 2018; Guenther et al., 2018; 
Lukkarinen et al., 2016; Mamonov and Malaga, 2018; Mohammadi and Shafi, 2018; Vismara, 
2016, 2018; Vulkan et al., 2016) and the funding dynamics on these platforms (e.g., Hornuf and 
Schwienbacher, 2018a; Vismara, 2018; Vulkan et al., 2016). It is important to understand how 
entrepreneurs can more successfully raise funds on equity crowdfunding platforms but if 
entrepreneurs do not create viable businesses with the money raised, investors and society at 
large will ultimately gain limited benefits. Thus, it is essential to understand what is happening 
after the equity crowdfunding campaign and how corporate governance can improve the viability 
and long-term success of these firms.  
 For this purpose, we have developed a conceptual model of the different mechanisms that 
could operate in the equity crowdfunding context to minimize adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems (see Table 1). In so doing, we move beyond the most often used theoretical framework 
in corporate governance, agency theory, which has largely focused on how shareholders (i.e., 
principals) should take actions to reduce agency problems created by entrepreneurs. Instead, 
drawing on an information economics perspective, we suggest that a combination of actors can 
trigger or install a host of (internal or external, formal or informal) governance mechanisms to 
reduce adverse selection and moral hazard problems. These actors include crowdinvestors, 
entrepreneurs themselves, equity crowdfunding platforms and governments (see Table 1).  
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First, the wisdom-of-crowd effects may explain why equity crowdinvestors can select 
firms that are equally (or even more) likely to create value than professional investors, even when 
it does not make economic sense for crowdinvestors to conduct a detailed due diligence given 
their relatively small investments. Still, we lack evidence on wisdom-of-crowd effects in equity 
crowdfunding markets. While empirical work on the possibility that equity crowdinvestors are 
(not) wise, may not reach the contribution to theory threshold at many 
entrepreneurship/management journals, there is an increasing receptivity by leading journals for 
replication-style studies (e.g., Bettis et al., 2016). Finance journals have also been more receptive 
for studies that examine important aspects of a specific phenomenon. For instance, hundreds of 
empirical papers have been published on the question whether (and to what extent) public capital 
markets are efficient. However, by clarifying the possible boundary conditions of the wisdom of 
the crowd and how it interacts with the decision making of professional investors, there is still 
significant room for scholars to make important theoretical contributions as well. 
Second, entrepreneurs often provide credible signals that reduce adverse selection and 
moral hazard issues. While extant crowdfunding research has addressed how such signals could 
influence the ability of entrepreneurs to raise equity crowdfunding (e.g., Ahlers et al., 2015), 
future research should also examine how these signals eventually relate to firm success. Some of 
these signals, such as setting up a formal board of directors and appointing prominent directors, 
may not only have a signaling value at the time of raising funds but could also have more 
substantive effects on ECF firm behavior and success after the investment. To address such 
questions, scholars will need to collect data not only from equity crowdfunding platforms but 
they will also need to collect firm-level data on the actions, strategies and performance following 
an equity crowdfunding campaign. With the increasing maturity of equity crowdfunding markets, 
we now have sufficient firms that can be tracked across time. Moreover, the increasing 
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availability of data on private firms may provide significant benefits (e.g., Vanacker et al., 2017). 
For instance, in several European countries (such as Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and the UK) 
even the smallest and youngest firms report financial accounts data. 
Third, equity crowdfunding platforms may play an important role in ensuring that the 
information that firms provide on their platforms represents the facts, reducing adverse selection 
problems. Different platforms also have different modes of operating—with some platforms, for 
example, allowing crowdinvestors to become direct shareholders in firms, while others use a 
nominee structure—which may have important consequences for ECF firm governance and 
subsequent firm performance. Unfortunately, to date, scholars have primarily focused on data 
from one specific platform (e.g., Dushnitsky and Zunino, 2018). To increase our understanding of 
how platform structures and platform diversity influence firm performance, scholars need broader 
datasets that include firms that were listed on different platforms. Obviously, entrepreneurs 
themselves may self-select by applying for a listing on specific platforms that fit best with their 
characteristics and the characteristics of their firms, which should make scholars wary of such 
self-selection effects. 
Finally, governments set ‗the rules of the game‘ for equity crowdfunding and the 
effectiveness of these rules, in combination with national cultures, could also significantly reduce 
the adverse selection and moral hazard problems we discussed throughout this paper. The 
development of alternative factor markets such as the size and development of the venture capital 
and angel market might also be impactful. Existing crowdfunding research, however, has focused 
on funding success on a specific platform operating in a specific country. Recently, researchers 
have also explored how formal and informal country institutions influence the size of equity 
crowdfunding markets (e.g. Cumming et al., 2017b). However, this focus has constrained our 
understanding of how national institutions influence the decisions and outcomes of ECF firms 
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themselves. Again, we not only need evidence on the institutions and factor markets that 
influence the size of equity crowdfunding markets but also on how they can influence the success 
of ECF firms. Such research should use cross-country datasets to examine how ECF firms 
develop and perform relative to similar firms that do not attract crowdfunding, and how national 
institutions moderate this relationship. 
Additional Avenues for Future Research 
Having presented a research framework on the governance of ECF firms and its impact on firm 
success, our discussion highlights some additional avenues for future research. First, our 
framework suggests that some governance mechanisms will probably be more effective than 
others in addressing adverse selection and moral hazard problems, respectively (Table 1). We 
also discussed these governance mechanisms in a largely sequential manner. However, any 
mechanism in isolation is unlikely to be completely effective in reducing severe adverse selection 
and moral hazard issues. Still, governance research has often focused on a specific governance 
mechanism, such as the board of directors, in isolation (e.g., Audretsch and Lehmann, 2014). The 
equity crowdfunding context opens up opportunities to examine how different governance 
mechanisms at different levels (i.e., firm-platform-country) interact and impact firm 
development—an issue that has not been systematically explored in the broader governance 
literature (e.g., Aguilera et al., 2008; Strange et al., 2009; Vanacker et al., 2014). For example, a 
promising avenue for future research is to examine how the heterogeneity in the strength of 
contracts between crowdinvestors and ECF firms (often linked to the choice of crowdfunding 
platform on which entrepreneurs will list their projects) and the national governance systems 
have a complementary or substitutive effect. 
Second, the framework presented in Table 1 focuses on governance mechanisms as value 
protection safeguards, consistent with the broader governance literature. However, research on 
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how corporate governance mechanisms can potentially create value in ECF firms is lacking. 
Equity crowdinvestors can provide ECF firms with more than money. Equity crowdinvestors 
often also provide feedback and they could serve as ECF firm ‗ambassadors‘. The question of 
how entrepreneurs can attract valuable crowdinvestors remains unaddressed. We know that 
entrepreneurs can communicate with potential crowdinvestors through the platforms on which 
they are listed (Block et al., 2018) but we do not know whether differences in entrepreneurial 
behavior allow firms to attract funding from a crowd with distinct characteristics and 
backgrounds—and whether this matters for ECF firm outcomes. Recent theoretical work 
indicates that firms may obtain distinct competitive advantages from engaging with online 
communities (Fisher, 2018). Still, currently, we lack evidence on whether, how and when equity 
crowdinvestors can add extra-financial value to ECF firms.  
 Third, recent research on crowdfunding and equity crowdfunding, in particular, has 
further strengthened the already heavily segmented entrepreneurial finance literature (Cumming 
and Johan, 2017). Entrepreneurs generally use several sources of financing to form and grow 
their ventures (Cosh et al., 2009). Still, academic papers generally focus on one specific source of 
finance (or two sources at a maximum). For instance, we have a relatively established literature 
on venture capital, angel financing, bank financing, trade debt and now a growing stream of work 
on (equity) crowdfunding. However, cross-fertilization between these literature streams is 
limited. The question of how entrepreneurs choose between these different sources of financing 
also remains largely unexplored. Existing equity crowdfunding research, for instance, focuses on 
the firms that are already listed on specific platforms (e.g., Walthoff-Borm et al., 2018a). Thus, 
we need to better understand why entrepreneurs search for specific sources of financing, how 
they combine different sources of financing, and how their bundle of financing sources influences 
firm behaviors and outcomes. Overall, we need more work that crosses the largely distinct 
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literature streams that are segmented by financing source within the entrepreneurial finance 
literature.  
Practical implications 
Even though we currently lack evidence on the governance of ECF firms and its impact on firm 
performance, our conceptual framework provides some guidance and implications for policy-
makers. It suggests that the need for governments to craft stricter regulations that reduce adverse 
selection problems in equity crowdfunding markets should be evaluated next to alternative 
governance mechanisms that might be available. Notably, there are other mechanisms at the 
crowd- and crowdfunding platform-levels that could be effective in dealing with adverse 
selection. At the crowd-level, wisdom-of-crowd effects can lead to the selection of firms that are 
equally, if not more, likely to create value relative to those firms selected by professional 
investors. Even if future empirical work finds that crowds are not ‗wise‘, one can wonder whether 
it is the role of governments to protect the crowd against their ‗madness‘. It could be sufficient 
for governments to craft ‗soft‘ regulations that limit crowdinvestors to invest excessive portions 
of their total wealth exclusively in equity crowdfunding. Besides this, crowdinvestors will learn 
with their own money whether the potential returns are worthwhile for the risk they take, 
especially because specific crowdinvestors may also value other benefits besides monetary 
returns such as supporting entrepreneurship. Furthermore, at the platform-level, there are also 
some mechanisms that could reduce adverse selection issues. Platforms can perform more 
thorough due diligence to screen out the lowest quality firms. Platform managers also have strong 
reputational incentives to device mechanisms that reduce adverse selection because over time, 
more failures of ECF firms funded through their platforms are likely to reduce the inflow of new 
deals, hampering the survival of their own business.  
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 However, the role of governments to develop regulations that discourage moral hazard 
problems in ECF firms may be particularly critical. Once invested, even ‗wise‘ crowdinvestors 
obtain largely illiquid shares. In essence, they are locked-in until an exit can be realized several 
years after their investment. Some platforms also take a relatively passive attitude after the 
crowdfunding campaign. While some platforms device more professional contracts and manage 
the shares of the crowd, they are not necessarily active in boards of directors.
6
 Platforms can also 
create co-investment structures, where they require the crowd to co-investment with professional 
investors, who have more incentives to monitor. Still, in all these cases, minority investors 
require efficient courts and investor laws that protect them against opportunistic behaviors by 
entrepreneurs, who often remain controlling shareholders. Fostering the development of capital 
market-based governance mechanisms, such as active secondary markets for the shares of ECF 
firms, could also be instrumental. 
 Governments not only serve as regulators of equity crowdfunding markets but also often 
provide individuals with tax reductions when they invest in early-stage firms through equity 
crowdfunding platforms or other means. A key reason behind such tax shelter initiatives is that 
they might activate the significant amounts of savings that otherwise just remain on savings 
accounts. The money that is infused into the economy in this fashion may serve as a strong 
facilitator for entrepreneurship and economic growth. Thus, governments need research that 
informs them on whether the costs to support the development of the equity crowdfunding market 
are worthwhile, given the benefits it creates. The question whether equity crowdfunding markets 
can create viable businesses and how this market can be governed to create more successful 
                                                          
6
 Boards might not even be present in ECF firms and even when they are it remains challenging for (crowd) 
representatives on the board to represent a heterogeneous group of investors with different backgrounds, interests, 
and time horizons. 
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businesses is crucial from a policy perspective. If equity crowdfunding markets, however, mainly 
create firms ‗zombie firms‘ or ‗empty shells‘, this could not only imply the ineffectiveness of tax 
shelter initiative but actually entails that governments indirectly hamper the productivity of 
existing firms. Such insights will obviously also be crucial for entrepreneurs themselves as they 
search for the financial resources needed to startup and grow their firms. 
In summary, we see both opportunities and threats related to the developing equity 
crowdfunding market. We hope that our paper offers a meaningful starting point for significantly 
more research that enhances our theoretical and empirical understanding of ECF firm governance 
and how it impacts ECF firm success.  
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Table 1: Governance mechanisms that potentially operate in equity crowdfunding markets 
Governance 
Mechanism  
Adverse Selection 
 
Moral Hazard 
     Crowdinvestors     
     
Wisdom of the crowd 
 
When the crowd is wise, this mechanism might be very 
effective in reducing adverse selection problems. If the 
wisdom of the crowd mechanism does not work, other 
governance mechanisms, such as platform due diligence, 
should become more developed to reduce adverse selection. 
 
The wisdom of crowds mechanism may reveal moral hazard 
issues. However, the diversity in backgrounds, goals and time 
horizons of small equity crowdinvestors may provide more 
discretion to entrepreneurs, thereby fostering moral hazard 
problems. Additional governance mechanisms will be required 
to minimize moral hazard issues.  
     Entrepreneurs         
     
Signaling and related 
substantive actions  
Entrepreneurial signaling may decrease adverse selection. It 
may further reduce the need for formal regulations that 
increase information availability. 
 
Signaling and related substantive actions (e.g., board 
formation and composition) can limit moral hazard. However, 
signaling will need to be combined with other governance 
mechanisms, such as active secondary markets and strong 
investor protection laws, to minimize moral hazard issues. 
     Platforms         
     
Due diligence   
If the wisdom of crowds mechanism functions, probably the 
most important task for platforms is to reduce fraud cases and 
assure that information provided on platforms represents the 
facts. When crowds are not (sufficiently) wise, more detailed 
platform due diligence should become more important to 
reduce adverse selection. 
  Does not directly address moral hazard. 
     
Structural differences 
across platforms; for 
example, shareholder 
structures 
  
Both direct and nominee shareholder structures do not 
directly address adverse selection issues. In the co-investment 
structure, however, crowdinvestors may benefit from the due 
diligence efforts of professional investors.  
  
The direct shareholder structure might be more problematic in 
dealing with moral hazard problems because of shareholder 
dispersion and related free-rider problems. The nominee 
structure and co-investment structure might be more effective 
because of shareholder concentration.  
When voting rights are offered to crowdinvestors on platforms 
this may facilitate professional investor involvement and 
corporate governance more broadly. 
     
Secondary markets 
 
Does not directly address adverse selection. 
 
May be effective to reduce moral hazard by creating a form of 
market discipline. 
 
  
      
56 
 
Table 1 [Continued] 
Governance 
Mechanism  
Adverse Selection 
 
Moral Hazard 
     Country Institutions         
     
Formal institutions   
Laws that increase information availability may be important to 
reduce adverse selection but can also be problematic because 
they raise the cost of firms that search for equity crowdfunding. 
  
Strong investor protection laws may be particularly important 
to curtail self-dealing and other moral hazard problems. The 
effectiveness of these laws may further depend on how 
elaborate shareholder agreements are between crowdinvestors 
and the ECF firm. 
     
Informal institutions 
 
Informal institutions, such as trust, may be efficient to reduce both adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Also, informal and 
formal institutions may have complementary or substitutive effects.  
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Appendix A: Overview of existing equity crowdfunding research 
Author(s)  Sample  Dependent variables Independent variables Main findings 
     
Ahlers et al. 
(2015) 
104 projects listed on the 
Australian platform 
ASSOB between October 
2006 - October 2011 
Fully funded dummy, 
number of investors, 
investment amount and 
speed of investment 
Human capital, social 
(alliance) capital, 
intellectual capital, equity 
share retained by 
entrepreneurs, financial 
projections 
Retaining equity and providing more detailed 
information about risks can be interpreted as effective 
signals and can therefore strongly impact the probability 
of funding success.  
     
Vismara (2016) 271 projects listed on the 
UK platforms Crowdcube 
and Seedrs between 2011 
– 2014 
Number of investors and 
funding amount 
Percentage of equity 
offered and social capital 
Campaigns launched by entrepreneurs (1) who sold a 
smaller fraction of their companies at listing and (2) had 
more social capital had higher probabilities of funding 
success. 
     
Lukkarinen et al. 
(2016) 
60 projects on the 
Invesdor platform 
between May 2012 and 
September 2014. The 
sample includes 1,742 
investments, of which 
76% were made into 
successful campaigns. 
Number of investors and 
amount raised 
‗Traditional‘ investment 
criteria (e.g., team, 
markets, scalability, terms, 
stage) and crowdfunding 
features (e.g, early funding 
from private network, 
social media networks, 
understandability of 
concept) 
The criteria used by venture capitalists or angels are not 
of prime importance for funding success in equity 
crowdfunding. Funding success is instead related to pre-
selected crowdfunding campaign features and the 
utilization of private and public networks 
     
Agrawal et al. 
(2016) 
N.A. N.A. N.A. Syndicates may reduce market failures caused by 
information asymmetry by shifting the focal investment 
activities of the crowd from startups to lead investors. 
     
Hornuf & 
Neuenkirch 
(2017) 
44 projects and 499 
backers who invested 
during the period from 
November 6, 2011, to 
March 25, 2014, on the 
German equity 
crowdfunding portal 
Innovestment.  
Premium over ticket price 
(Premium = 100 x (offered 
price - ticket price)/ticket 
price) 
Campaign characteristics 
(e.g., pre-valuation, 
funding goal), backer 
sophistication (e.g., 
investment experience), 
progress in the funding 
campaign (e.g., funding 
share, funding goal 
reached), herding, stock 
market volatility, 
remaining time 
Campaign characteristics, investor sophistication, 
progress in funding, herding, and stock market volatility 
influence backers' willingness to pay for shares in equity 
crowdfunding. Geographic distance, learning effects, and 
sniping at the end of an auction have no effect. 
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Appendix A [Continued] 
Author(s)  Sample  Dependent variables Independent variables Main findings 
Hornuf & 
Schwienbacher 
(2017) 
N.A. N.A. N.A. A theoretical model that shows that too strong investor 
protection may harm entrepreneurial initiatives. Optimal 
regulation depends on the availability of alternative 
early-stage financing such as venture capital and angel 
finance.  
     
Block et al. 
(2018) 
71 projects and 39,399 
investment decisions on 
two German equity 
crowdfunding portals. 
Number of investments and 
the amount of capital 
pledged 
Number of updates and 
update characteristics 
Posting an update has a positive effect on funding 
success. This effect lags the update by a few days. The 
effect of updates loses statistical significance with the 
number of updates posted during a campaign. Easier 
language used in updates increases crowd participation. 
The positive effect of updates can be attributed to 
updates about new developments of the start-up such as 
campaign developments, new funding, business 
developments, and cooperation projects.  
     
Mamonov & 
Malaga (2018) 
133 venture listings across 
16 US platforms 
Funding success (i.e., 
raising the minimum 
amount of capital that was 
sought) 
Variables related to market 
risk, execution risk and 
agency risk 
Lower market (i.e., ventures that completed product or 
service development and have large corporate clients), 
execution (i.e., ventures with larger entrepreneurial 
teams) and agency risks (e.g., ventures that attracted 
angel or venture capital funding) positively affect 
funding success  
     
Guenther et al. 
(2018) 
104 projects listed on the 
Australian platform 
ASSOB between 2006 
and June 2012. Including 
418 retail investors, 76 
accredited, 5 professional, 
79 foreign, 25 associates, 
and 43 existing 
shareholders 
Investment decision 
dummy 
Distance Geographic distance is negatively correlated with 
investment probability for all home country investors. A 
comparison of home country and overseas investors 
reveals that overseas investors are not sensitive to 
distance.  
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Appendix A [Continued] 
Author(s)  Sample  Dependent variables Independent variables Main findings 
Mohammadi & 
Shafi (2018) 
2,537 investments by 
1979 unique investors 
between 2012 and March 
2015 from FundedByMe 
(Swedish platform) 
Firm age, technology firm 
and equity offering 
Gender Female investors are less likely to invest in the equity of 
firms that are younger and high tech and have a higher 
percentage of equity offerings. Female investors are also 
more likely to invest in projects in which the proportion 
of male investors is higher. 
     
Kshetri (2018) N.A. N.A. N.A. Exploring the effects of informal institutions on 
entrepreneurs' ability and willingness to engage in efforts 
to raise equity crowdfunding. 
     
Brown et al. 
(2018) 
42 equity crowdfunded 
start-ups in the UK 
N.A. N.A. There is strong demand for equity crowdfunding from 
entrepreneurs within innovative, consumer-focused, 
early-stage firms. Equity crowdfunding also seems to 
confer intangible benefits to companies which amount to 
more than money.  
     
Vismara (2018) 132 projects on 
Crowdcube in 2014 
The percentage of public 
profile investors, the 
number of early investors 
over the first 5 days of 
offerings and the number 
of investors after the first 5 
days. 
Public investors and early 
investors 
Information cascades among individual investors play a 
crucial role. Investors with a public profile increase the 
appeal of the offer among early investors, who in turn 
attract late investors. 
     
Signori & 
Vismara (2018) 
212 firms that raised 
initial equity 
crowdfunding on 
Crowdcube between 
2011-2015 
Failure, Follow-on 
fundraising 
Investor participation in the 
initial offering, company- 
and offering-specific 
variables 
18% of firms already failed. 9% raised follow-on 
financing in the form of a private equity injection and 
25% raised a follow-on crowdfunding offering. Three 
firms were acquired. Firms with more dispersed 
ownership are less likely to issue further equity, while 
those that reach the target capital more quickly are more 
likely to launch a follow-on offering. Further, none of the 
firms initially backed by qualified investors subsequently 
failed. 
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Appendix A [Continued] 
Author(s)  Sample  Dependent variables Independent variables Main findings 
Walthoff-Borm et 
al. (2018a) 
277 firms that searched 
for equity crowdfunding 
between 2012 and 2015 
on Crowdcube and two 
matched samples of firms 
that did not list on 
crowdfunding platforms 
but were similar in terms 
of firm industry, age and 
size. 
Searching for equity 
crowdfunding dummy 
Internal funds, leverage, 
tangible assets, intangible 
assets 
Firms list on equity crowdfunding platforms as a ‗last 
resort‘—that is, when they lack internal funds and 
additional debt capacity. Firms listed on equity 
crowdfunding platforms are less profitable, more often 
have excessive debt levels, and have more intangible 
assets than matched firms not listed on these platforms. 
     
Walthoff-Borm et 
al. (2018b) 
250 firms that raised 
equity crowdfunding from 
Crowdcube or Seedrs. 
Firm financial and 
innovative performance 
Equity crowdfunding, 
direct versus nominee 
shareholder structure 
ECF firms have higher failure rates than matched non-
ECF firms. However, more ECF firms have patent 
applications than matched non-ECF firms. Within the 
group of ECF firms, ECF firms financed through a 
nominee structure make smaller losses, while ECF firms 
financed through a direct shareholder structure have more 
new patent applications, including foreign patent 
applications. 
     
Hornuf & 
Schwienbacher 
(2018a) 
89 funding campaigns, 
which were run by 81 
startups on four German 
platforms. Investors 
funding these campaigns 
made 26,967 investment 
decisions. 
Investments Information disclosure, 
peer effect, end-of-
campaign, and collective 
action variables. 
In contrast with campaigns on Kickstarter, on which the 
typical pattern of project support is U shaped, equity 
crowdfunding dynamics are L shaped under a first-come, 
first-served mechanism and U shaped under a second-
price auction. Investors base their decisions on 
information provided by the entrepreneur in the form of 
updates as well as by the investment behavior and 
comments of other crowd investors. 
Hornuf & 
Schwienbacher 
(2018b) 
181 successful and 
unsuccessful campaigns 
between August 2011 and 
September 31, 2014 on a 
broad set of German 
platforms 
Number of investors, 
campaign success, amount 
raised 
Low minimum 
ticket, pooled investment 
scheme, and profit-
participating loans 
Crowd participation is largest when the minimum ticket 
size is small, the crowd is pooled in a financial vehicle, 
and the crowd is offered investments in the form of 
profit-participating loans. These mechanisms also 
increase the chances of achieving successful campaigns 
and raising a larger amount. 
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Appendix A [Continued] 
Author(s)  Sample  Dependent variables Independent variables Main findings 
Estrin et al. 
(2018) 
64 semi-structured 
interviews between 2014 
and 2017 
N.A. N.A. The large financial flows to entrepreneurs in the UK have 
probably been largely incremental to traditional sources 
of early-stage entrepreneurial finance. Investors appear to 
understand and appropriately evaluate the risks that they 
are bearing. ECF allows entrepreneurs to test their 
products, to develop their brand, to build a loyal 
customer base and to turn customers into investors.  
     
Hornuf et al. 
(2018) 
413 firms that ran at least 
one successful equity 
crowdfunding campaign 
(on 13 different portals) in 
Germany or the United 
Kingdom between 2011 
and 2016 
Follow‐up funding, firm 
failure 
Senior management team, 
trademarks and patents, 
ECF campaign 
characteristics,  
German ECF firms stood a higher chance of obtaining 
follow-up funding through business angels or venture 
capitalists but also had a higher likelihood of failure. The 
number of senior managers and initial venture capital 
investors had a positive impact on obtaining follow-up 
funding, whereas the average age of the senior 
management team had a negative impact. The number of 
initial venture capital investors and the valuation of the 
firm were significant predictors increasing the hazard of 
firm failure, whereas the number of senior managers and 
the amount raised during previous equity crowdfunding 
campaigns had a negative impact.  
 
Notes. The Table includes selected papers on the topic ‗equity crowdfunding‘ included in Web of Science‘s Social Science Citation Index within the Business, 
Management and Economics categories. 
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